Living on the Fenceline

Overview | Conversations with Advocates of Fair Growth | Living on the Fenceline

Monique Harden

Monique Harden, 34, is a staff attorney at Earth Justice who does community organizing among residents who live on the fenceline with toxic industries. A long-time resident of Louisiana, whose great grandfather died building on of the levees, Harden is a straight-talking woman who can translate legalese into plain English and deal with contentious issues diplomatically. While Harden is quick to point signs of entrenched racism in the River Parishes, she chooses her words carefully and gives credit to industrialists when it is deserved.

A visit to Harden's office in downtown New Orleans is instructive in itself. If you take the olive green trolley down St. Charles Street under the bower of ancient live oaks to Poydras Street, it is only a few blocks to One Shell Square, a towering white-marble high-rise that anchors Shell's Louisiana operations. A few blocks away the 34-story Texaco Center, sheathed in black marble, is further evidence that the wheels of business in Louisiana are lubricated with oil. Gawking up at these two megaliths that rise above the city it becomes clear that beneath its hip, honky-tonk surface, New Orleans is all business when it comes to oil.

Conveniently located a few blocks away are the offices of that gadfly of industry, Earth Justice, an environmental justice advocacy organization, housed in a four-story beige-brick building with wrought-iron terraces. It is here that attorney Monique Harden works with communities that experience the downside of living next to the big oil refineries.

Interview

Steve Lerner (SDL): How did you get involved in this work?

Monique Harden (MH:) I was born in San Francisco but I finished growing up in New Orleans, My family moved here when I was ten years old back in 1978. I went to St. John's College in Annapolis, Maryland, a small liberal arts college, and then to law school at the University of Texas in Austin.

I really missed the city [New Orleans] the fragrant sweet olive and jasmine trees and bushes we have around here. And I was able to come back to town and buy a home with my sister. I ended up with a local renewable energy organization called Alliance for Political Energy and I started doing a lot of outreach work in River Parishes. For example, I developed a utility ratepayers' bill of rights because we had a lot of problems with energy companies treating ratepayers with cut-offs and shut-offs and that would have negative impacts on [River Parish] residents and their families.

I moved to Greenpeace in 1997 to work on their Toxics Campaign focused on PVC and particularly vinyl production in Louisiana. It was in that work that I was able to see for the first time how people live in Louisiana in the River Parishes. I saw very small, modest homes of African-American families with these huge, massive towering industrial facilities [next door]. It was absolutely shocking. I am embarrassed because I didn't know about it [conditions in the River Parishes] and I am from here. If you are driving along the interstate or you just go to the Parish offices you would not see it [how people live] on the route that you drive. To see that some of these industries retain the names of some of these plantations of the areas they built on was just a tremendous blow to me. And I though: 'OK, this is just unbelievably unjust what is going on and I have to do something about it.'

So the first group I had the pleasure of working with was St. James Citizens for Jobs and the Environment in Convent, Louisiana. They were fighting what was planned to be the world's largest PVC company with three incinerators and three processing units. At this point in time I decided I was just going to work on advocacy [instead of just litigation] because of the experiences I had working on legal cases with the Alliance for Political Energy did not ultimately succeed. And I thought that the strongest way to make change was through advocacy with the groups that are most affected by the problem whatever that is. And what I found with Shintech and working with the St. James [Johns?] Citizens for Jobs and the Environment, a dynamic group of people, mostly women mothers and grandmothers was how important it was to marry both litigation with advocacy and see the law as a tool and not the be-all-and-end-all; and how it [the law] can reinforce and support that community demand.

So, while at Greenpeace I was able to draft a petition challenging the permit that incorporated environmental justice issues and the obligations of EPA under the [Environmental Justice] Executive Order. And this petition was filed with the EPA's Administrative Division. From there we were able to get lots of press, lots of media attention, more and more for our group, and members joining a coaltion to support this effort. The community was saying: 'Enough is enough: we have had too much.' They had 17 million pounds of air pollution, about a dozen or so facilities around their homes, and Shintech was going to build the largest and next to the homes and churches. The communities in this area were about 80 percent African American.

Another experience I learned from was how industries come into the state of Louisiana. First there is the agreement between the CEO of the company and the Governor who pledges the support of any other local officials who have input on the decision-making [ab out their permits and their regulation]. So it is very top down. The environmental permitting and how we do it [regulate the companies] becomes a pro forma matter. And so that really enraged the residents when I began digging around and finding documents [which proved that a deal had been made] long before they [community residents] even knew that this project was being prepared for their community.

With the EPA what we were dealing with was having the Agency calling us and playing poker and saying: 'Well, we really concerned about you all [residents] here and if we make a decision it might not go your way. So maybe you should just withdraw the petition and we can come up with a number of agreements and options to support residents that would not have any legal bearing on enforcement mechanism attached to it. And the residents were really clear: Enough is enough. And it was really important in terms of the coalition how the ultimate goal of coalition members [various non-profits working on this issue] was supporting the residents and nothing else. If we [in the non-profit sector] said let's see what other deals can be made it would have created a lot of conflict and division between those organizations and the residents by not taking the residents seriously. What we were able to do, though, with the leadership of the Convent St. James Citizens for Jobs and the Environment was stick to our guns and say [to the EPA] you have to make your decision on this petition. And we had some inside help at the Agency -- people who would keep us abreast of the dealings, which is something that always happens in these cases.

In October 1997 we were able to get a decision. Carole Browner, EPA Administrator at that time, blocked the permits with environmental justice concerns being part of it. The EPA also found about 50 errors in one of the air permits that had been drafted by the DEQ [the state Department of Environmental Quality]. What I should back up and say at this point is that with the first draft of our petition we were able to get EPA to send a letter to DEQ saying hold of on issuing the permit because there have been some concerns that have been raised. So it was quite strategic that we sent the petition before EPA's decision was final so they had this to consider.

I am leaving out a huge amount of detail, but suffice it to say that was a learning experience in a number of respect: one, in the role that I can play combing my legal background and my interest and desire to work with communities . . . work and try to develop coalitions around a community struggle . . . and what that means in terms of relationship building and trust and focus and the effectiveness of the groups . . . and hearing and supporting the decisions of the community . . . as a lead on how we pursue things. The other thing I learned was how government really works with regard to these kinds of decisions and how much control industrial companies really have in the process. But that [advantage] does not [necessarily] overcome a really strong strategy that is lead by the community group. And that was the case in Shintech.

SDL: What was the key reason you were able to block the building of the Shintech complex. There was, on the ground, this strong community organization. But having a strong organization on the ground doesn't always stop the deal [between the CEO of the industry and the Governor] that is made at the top. Was is that you were able to follow the regulatory paper trail and bring it to the attention of the press and the EPA authorities?

MH: More than that . . . of course having that information is crucial . . . but you use that information to develop coalitions of support. We were able to get all members of the Congressional Black Caucus to sign letters to EPA really going over the details of what this project would mean; understanding what the petition was all about; referring to the Clean Air Act plus the President's Executive Order on Environmental Justice, and embracing that concept. And they [the Congressional Black Caucus] called on the EPA and asked what they were doing at this time.

So when I am talking about coalitions it extends beyond, obviously, the community organizing aspect that are confined by the parish or the town; and it also extends beyond environmental groups or social justice organizations. You also want to be able to get the help and support of decision makers and some of them are what we call 'back fighters.' That means they may not be able to take an advocacy role like the Congressional Black Caucus did but they can provide support in other ways. And [it is important to be able to] accept and be able to use that [kind of support].

So, we kept the pressure on EPA from a number of groups that were continually growing and getting stronger. It was very important that this was not something that they could just ignore. The [legal and regulatory] grounds were there for them to block the permit and that was something they did not want to do. But this was the first time that the Agency ever denied a state-issued Clean Air Act permit. And then when they included environmental justice concerns it was just really remarkable.

SDL: Was that precedent setting?

MH: It was.

SDL: I spoke with Beverley Wright [at the Deep South Center on Environmental Justice] and she mentioned Convent also. I take it a number of groups were involved in this struggle. How did you work that out?

MH: We had regular meetings. At Greenpeace some staff took on the job of sending out weekly mailers: these are the news clippings, this is the information discovered . . . and having conference calls on a weekly basis with the community and with all other groups involved. And what are our next steps. [someone would suggest:] 'Maybe this is a great angle we can focus on. Or think about this.' We had trouble along the way. They [industry] tried to promote one woman as a group . . . one woman who was a resident of the community. They promoted her as a group supporting the project because of jobs.

SDL: They being . . .

MH: Shintech. And they trotted out . . . 'Well, we have contracts and we are ready to sign people up . . . but really the jobs required some technical engineering background . . . '

And what we didn't want to do was wind up insulting the community. So you could trot out census data about how many people don't have high school diplomas and that sort of thing or GED equivalents. Or, you could say: "Listen, everybody is for economic development but why would you get [promote] a project that is not matched with the skills of people who want to work in that area.

SDL: . . . Instead of insulting them and saying that people here have very little education and they are all poor.

MH: Exactly and putting it back in the court of the government. If you really want to do a good job here it requires finding what is best suited to the community to employ them and get them good-paying jobs.

SDL: So this was a mismatch and in the end they would have brought people in from outside for the jobs.

MH: Yes, and that is what happens all the time at the end of any shift there is a long line of trucks moving out of the community. And that is also a way of not falling into the trap of the division: of saying this is jobs vs. environment. Everyone knows it is both things. That's why it is called St. James Citizens for Jobs and the Environment. We didn't want to fall into this trap that we were saying 'no' to jobs. What we were saying was 'yes' to jobs that would work for the people in this community. And there were [already] 12 facilities that people can walk to and they are not employed yet so there is a problem here.

SDL: That must have been gratifying to win that one.

SDL: Yes, it was. And the experience left me with two understandings that have been really important in the NORCO struggle. One, how do you support communities that have been struggling for years and years and may feel worn out and frustrated? Sometimes for community leaders there is not enough support from within the community they are working in. People [residents] feel: 'Well, we tried it and it didn't work, we sued them and it didn't work, we protested here and there and it didn't work, and I have work to do and children to raise . . . call me if you need me.'

It is frustrating to them [core community activists] because they need more energy and more effort. And so one of the things that is important for community leaders to understand is that people are going to contribute in various levels and they have to figure out ways not to set the bar so high that they can't do it or it is overwhelming to them. Even if it is [just] a phone tree and you can call five folks . . . whatever. People can say: 'Yes, I can do that.' And that goes a long way so then people can participate.

And their involvement is based on results: once you can show good results then more and more people will come out. That is why the [Louisiana] Bucket Brigade has been so exceptionally important to NORCO and many other communities in Louisiana. It has really been able to draw out more people who see: 'This is in my air, this exceeds state air standards, or show that after a company reports an emission to the agencies or authorities that then an inspection did proceed. So, more people can come out now because they are seeing that change is happening. And it is in their control . . . and they can trust how the information is collected . . . They can believe it because they did it [captured the air samples and had them analyzed]; instead of DEQ coming in and saying that they didn't find anything because they came hours later or the monitor is not set for this [type of chemical or concentration level]. So some people don't even call DEQ because they think it is not going to go anywhere and they are not going to do anything right. But the [LBB] air sampling work has been really tremendous as an organizing effort as well as making both agencies and the companies more accountable.

SDL: So Shintech was in January 1997.

MH: Right January to October1997. But we really began working on this in 1996.

SDL: When did you begin to focus on Diamond?

MH: I knew a lot about the Diamond community and in 1998 I was on my way out to Los Angeles for and Environmental Justice Advisory Council meeting where I wanted to focus on was the Morrisonville [sp?] community, in southwest Louisiana, another African-American community just outside of Lake Charles where there is the largest concentration of PVC facilities in the country within a half mile of the lake and people's homes. I got a call from the Deep South Center on Environmental Justice wanting to know if I could go to a meeting with Margie Richard and some of the staff folks at Shell to discuss relocation and I couldn't do it because of my travel situation but I did follow up with them [later]. And the [subsequent] meeting was a complete failure with Don Baker at Shell telling Margie [Richard] and the Deep South Center staff that were there that 'relocation is off the table and we are not talking about it ever.'

This is in March of 1998. Later that year we were able to get the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council . . . I should explain what that is. Through the President's Executive Order on Environmental Justice it allowed EPA to create various mechanisms for how they were going to address environmental justice issues. And what EPA and other federal agencies decided to do, among other things, was create a citizen's advisory board called the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council. And it is made up of various stakeholders including community groups, business and industry, government and elected officials, and then environmental health organizations. And the way the council works and it has been operating since around 1995, is that it has quarterly meetings around the country and at each of the quarterly meetings there are opportunities for folks to raise issues and environmental justice concerns. And it is not necessarily limited to community groups: anyone can come and do this. But community groups want to go there for the help and assistance of NEJAC. And the way the council is structured is into various subcommittees. For example there is waste and facility siting, air and water, environmental health etc. Each of those subcommittees also have their own agenda and try to involve decision makers and the people who are raising these issues to get together and try to find ways to resolve it. In addition to that, reporting back to the full council, recommendations to EPA about how proceed on issue x or y.

And they gave a lot of help on Shintech. It also involves a tour of the local area. And I worked with Margie Richard and a woman from Baton Rouge, Juanita Stewart and XXXXX Robinson set up what this tour would look like coming from Baton Rouge where the meeting was going to be held at a hotel and move down Cancer Ally. And so we were going to have four tour buses of people in government and business and from the community who would really be able to tell the story. And the whole tour plan and the information that was in it had to go through this whole process of approval. By-and-large there were no changes to what we submitted but it included a really detailed tour of the Diamond community and NORCO.

So, if you can imagine four tour buses going across the Bonnet Carre Spillway up River Road down Washington Street to Margie [Richard's] house, then going up Bethune Street and then down River Road again to Apple Street and between the oil refineries around Motiva and Orion. And one of the things that happens when you have these groups is that the industries clean up so you won't smell anything. I remember when I was working at Greenpeace a plant worker told me: 'I love it when you guys set up tours because we work double time and it is good pay in order to clean up and make this facility presentable.'

And that is what happened on this day. However, at Shell, one of the units was over pressured and a gas leak occurred. And for people on Washington Street and behind Washington Street they saw this white gassy cloud coming between the bottom of their doors and the floor . . . coming into their houses and immediately the had watery eyes, burning nose and throat, and many people going to the emergency room. Shell began sending out press releases that there was a 'non-toxic gas release.' Those were their words. And there was confusion because they were trying to evacuate kids out of the school and so parents didn't know where their children were. And that night when NEJAC had that open forum Margie came with other residents, a mother and two children, to talk about what happened earlier that day when they were rushed to the Emergency Room, how they felt, and all of the physical problems they had from this. And outside that room we had a caucus with DEQ there and other lawyers there saying we have to fix this problem: this can't keep happening.

SDL: Were the people on the buses there when the release happened?

MH: No. The cloud happened the very next day. And Denny Larson was there and taped us grilling DEQ in the hall after Margie [Richard] made her statement. And early that day he was able to take a sample and rush it to a Performance Analytical Laboratory out in California, which is an EPA approved lab for detecting chemicals from air samples that they get through the Bucket Brigade work. They went through this rushed, expedited analysis and gave back the results as quickly as they could after making sure that the proper quality control steps were all taken. And later that month the Deep South Center was holding its annual symposium and the environmental justice groups from around the country were there and they released the results and contrasted that with what Shell was putting out weeks earlier. The analysis showed that it was a chemical called methylethylketone [MEK], which in high levels causes irritated eyes, ears, nose, and throat.

And for me -- I am kind of getting chills now -- that was a ground-breaking moment because it is routine when a facility has a release and a community has a reaction to it and they complain about it, it is treated as anecdotal because there is no proof. [Industries say:] 'OK, we understand that you always call us and put in a complaint and all this stuff.' And DEQ says: 'Well, let's see if you contacted your doctor.' [But they are rarely] really serious finding out what happened instead of just making it paperwork and never addressing it. And this air sample [taken by Denny Larson] forced DEQ and EPA to address it.

Following the release of the MEK I came to the community on an evening in December. I remember it was quite cool and I remember as I got out of my car you could see this white gassy stuff coming out of the Shell Chemical plant and it was just thick like clouds and coming down to the ground . . . so it was just ground-level so as I got out of my car it was coming into my car when I opened the door. As I walked across the street to open Margie's door where the community meeting was I opened the door and it was coming in . . . it was just . . . I'm walking through it . . . they are walking through it . . . and I just finally made a commitment to myself: 'OK I'm here to work with this community because this is God awful.' It was unbelievable and this was supposed to pass as fine.

SDL: And when the previous MEK release had happened Shell had not reported it that anything had gone wrong?

MH: They reported that there was a non-toxic gas. That was heard on WWAM 870 on your radio. That was even part of their press release.

SDL: But there is a regulatory standard about when there is a release of a certain amount you have to report it to the authorities.

MH: That is a little confusing because what happened was that there were two releases that day. One was some sort of hydrochloric gas . . . don't quote me on that I'm not sure . . . but there was some other release. And because it is a chemical substance it requires a huge amount before it is reportable under environmental regulations the way they are. With the MEK they never owned up to that. So when we called EPA they thought we were talking about this other gaseous substance and they were telling us that wasn't really enough so thanks but no thanks. But this MEK was something that no one had known about but for the air sample.

SDL: So in other words they were caught.

MH: They were caught. The community decided to get EPA and DEQ here and hold a meeting here and talk about what happened and what didn't go right because on top of that [the release] people were not notified . . . some were others were not. We had this meeting on January 14 [1999] and it was really interesting because at that point in time I would hear from Margie [Richard] the problems with the law suit and the problems with the racial problems in the community and how this came into play in this lawsuit that was a nuisance lawsuit about ten or so years ago. The jury was Shell retirees and Shell employees. That just went in one ear and out the other for me. OK you are an employee but they just didn't buy it. And until that January 14th meeting I didn't understand what she was really saying until we had organized the tables so there would be a hot seat panel with all the agencies and Shell people to talk about this December 8th, 1998 incident with the MEK release. So January 14th, 1999 we had this meeting to discuss this.

We got a lot of media out, the community was putting press packets together and making the calls, handing it out to the media at the door, do their sign-up sheets . . . and this was important because Shell initially wanted to have the meeting on their facility site and DEQ was coordinating that and trying to pressure Margie into accepting that as a place to hold a meeting and then wanting to know from her who, specifically, would be coming. And we talked with them about how important it was that this be their meeting; you all control everything about the meeting: who comes, who stays. [And they said:] 'Well, we don't have enough money for a hall and the hall cost $50 . . . easy . . . let's put it in a hall that you have complete control over.

The reason that was important was that a dozen or so white residents, -- some with Shell jumper-suits and kind of had these mean expressions on their faces -- came in and they took the table that they thought was the front of the room. But it turned out that what they were really facing was going to be the food table . . . so they were really in the center, left-side of the room. And the room later became filled with residents from Diamond. The meeting began and they [the white contingent] tried to interfere as much as they could and we stopped them. Margie Richards was presenting information about what happened, not only about the methylethyleketone air sample but also about the frequency of accidents that had been going on that the Shell/ Motiva facility, which was extremely important.

And then we got into the question of who was contacted [when the accident occurred.] We had these emergency procedures in place . . . So we asked the room: who did not receive a call? And all of these brown arms go up in the air. Who did receive a call? White people all raise their hands. So, we have a problem here. At this point the table with the white residents are very angry: 'You are making this a race issue.' [they said]. 'No one is making it a race issue. It is what it is. No one in Diamond has been contacted or notified. You all say that you have been. There is a problem here in who is being protected under the circumstances that we all work with in NORCO,' [Diamond residents replied].

And that kind of went back and forth with the folks getting more and more agitated. Later on in the meeting we were trying to focus on: how can we get better . . . how can we solve this? And the question was asked: 'Who here wants clean air and clean water?' Again, all the brown arms are in the air and I am looking at this table of white residents and I see one of the older women began to raise her arm but when it got to about shoulder level and she looks around the table where everyone else has their hands balled into fists and she puts it into her lap. And at that point what Margie had been saying dawned on me about the mindset and the control . . . the town had been segregated [geographically] by do I want to live in this house or in this house but also in terms of the perceptions around Shell and what it means to have a livable community to the point where you would not raise your hand for clean air and clean water . . . something as basic, as fundamental, and as necessary as that. So, that was another learning experience that helped me really appreciate the reality of NORCO.

SDL: Wasn't there also a walkout of a bunch of white people from that meeting?

MH: Some of them did walk out and some of them did stay.

SDL: It is interesting the different ways that meeting was perceived. I did an interview with Bob Thomas who describes that meeting differently with Demu Smith saying: 'I'm not saying this is racism but this is very strange that all of the African-American residents here were not notified [of the accidental release]; and all the white people did.' And Thomas suggested that that was a divisive comment. You can look at it two ways: that someone was stating the obvious; or that someone was trying to divide the community and make trouble. And Thomas suggested that it wasn't helpful.

MH: And I think that Thomas is at best completely naive because the division was already there. And his concerned ought to be why hadn't everyone in the town been notified.

SDL: There is a point in my interview with Thomas when he reports that when people were asked if they were notified about the release that some of the African-American residents started to raise their hands and then looked around and saw that everyone else in their community wasn't raising their hands and so they put their hands down.

MH: Hmmm. I didn't see that.

SDL: So his perception is exactly the opposite of what you saw among the whites. As a reporter I just want to point that out that this meeting was seen very differently by different people. Nevertheless, it does sound as if it was a catalytic moment: it is one of the few times where the race issue came to a head between the different populations of NORCO. I did a couple of interviews on the white side of town with the usual spokespeople: Milton Cambre and Sal Digirolamo. But it was hard to find white residents who would stand up and say that they were worried about environmental conditions . . . although I bet there are some. But they may be worried about what it will be like going to the grocery store after you have been quoted as saying that there is a problem with Shell.

MH: Exactly. Where does that come from? People do not wake up and say: I want to be absolutely controlled; I want to be scared. No one wakes up that way so the fact that that kind of pressure is there on residents, both black and white, it is really quite scary to me. After the meeting I really got a sense of what Jim Crow Louisiana must have felt like. And you can read in the books and talk to your grandmother and grandfather and aunts and uncles who lived here during that time but being able to see people operate on such a deep level of what do you want for yourself? And not being able to say: yes I want this [clean air and clean water] because it might offend other people . . . which is really awfully scary to me.

SDL: This is the company town effect.

MH: Yeah, and you can say that but I guess you can embrace or acknowledge something but then when you feel it or experience it, it is just a different and deeper knowledge of it. And I have used the word 'company town' a whole bunch. But, again, when there is a basic question being asked . . . 'Who wants clean air and clean water?' . . . . And you can't say: 'Yes I do.' That really got me more than who was notified and who wasn't. That question was so basic. And the fact that not everyone could say: yes I want that . . . because of fear about how others will react to it. It shows you the power of that company in that town and how deeply people are affected by it in terms of how they have to express themselves.

SDL: What I hear from the white residents is: 'Well, every place has its dangers.' And: "I wouldn't live in New Orleans.'

MH: Right, and the Diamond residents say the same thing.

SDL: In a way every person makes his or her own calculation about what is acceptable and what is dangerous. When I go into NORCO I say: I'm getting out of here. This doesn't look good. But the people who have lived there for their whole lives and seen it come up and who have worked there and have relatives who have worked there they see it as their particular environment. So, I think, you get used to your jungle, whatever it is.

MH: Sure, we can all adapt, I guess. If you and I were born there we would probably look at it differently than we do right now without having that kind of acceptance about: this is the way it is.

SDL: What seems significant is that many of the people in the African-American community that did grow up there did not just accept the conditions but said: 'Let's get the hell out of here.' That gets me to this jobs issue. It is pretty clear that a lot of people on the whites side of town got jobs [at Shell] and a lot of people on the black side of town did not. Was that an issue you focused on in this struggle?

MH: No, actually, we didn't; but it is an issue that keeps coming up. It comes up in terms of trying to explain or describe the whole racial divide in the town; but also recognizing, too, that the history goes beyond Shell. Somehow or other Shell has not tried in any way to resolve it. And in some ways it is in the best position to do so.

SDL: You mean the racist history?

MH: Right: slavery, plantations, Jim Crow, segregation . . . all of that history. Shell came in at the height of Jim Crow. And even after that people have memories of when Shell had these bowling alleys and how they were denied entrance to them. Young boys from Diamond got small jobs setting up pins. But my point is that in some ways the companies are in the best position to at least encourage a change. But it seemed to have made things more entrenched than they are in other Louisiana communities.

SDL: There did seem a moment there where they [Shell] missed an opportunity. Black employees were not permitted to go to their bowling alleys or swim in their swimming pool nor were their families. Shell could have operated differently and taught the town that this is possible. And they failed to do that

MH: At least begin to do some of that in the 1970s.

SDL: I think that by then the facilities were gone.

MH: I'm not clear on when that happened.

SDL: It happened after the strike when the workers joined the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union.

MH: I didn't know that. But in terms of hiring practices that is sort of the only game in town and they control a whole lot in terms of the social fabric and the community projects. They still do. My point is that from the 1930s to the 1960s that is a piece of history where everybody was working and living under these horrendous racist conditions. But by the 1970s there is this wake up call and then things could have been improved. They could have made some changes. They could have said: We are out of that phase and now we are into integration and equal opportunity. And they still did nothing. At that point the issue really centers around jobs at the company than it did when there were plantations or Jim Crow . . . By then it was who works at Shell, who benefits from the company, and who does not.

SDL: In a way they [Shell officials] slit their own throat by not hiring some residents from Diamond [because they sowed the seeds of future discontent].

MH: In terms of how the town has this tremendous racial issue, how that issue is handled at this time is tied to jobs at Shell more than in the past. This indicates to me a better role this company could have had in that town. And then you get a situation like at that January 14th meeting where [some residents] because all their jobs what they own, where they go on vacation, what they eat is tied to this company, they can't say what is in the best interests of their family because they might cut me out of this deal. And [if they do ccriticize Shell] how are they going to be seen by their neighbor is now changed. So the tentacles are really deep.

SDL: Do you have some family that came from this area?

MH: My family came from Kentwood, Louisiana. But my great grandfather actually died working on the construction of the Bonnet Carre Spillway [adjacent to Diamond]. He stepped on a rusty nail and medical wonders were not what they are today and race being what it was he didn't have any medical treatment and he died weeks later of poisoning.

SDL: The building of the Bonnet Carre Spillway was what caused the first African-American community there to be moved, was it not?

MH: Yeah, on the other side of the Spillway is a community called Montz, Louisiana and it is my understanding that from Montz to Washington Street was all residential along that river section. So now a huge area is devoted to the Spillway so that New Orleans doesn't flood; and then the next section is the chemical facility [Shell Chemical].

SDL: Let's get back to your involvement in the struggle in Diamond. There came this point where Shell made this offer to make it possible for people on the first two streets to relocate but not those on the back two streets. How did you see that? It split the community, didn't it?

MH: What I thought was important was that the community had some information around how to organize a relocation struggle. I talked with Monica Rohde at the Center for Environment, Health and Justice [Located in VA, Alexandria or Arlington, near DC; Lois Gibbs is the director of that center] because I know from the Love Canal experience that that organization has put together a lot of documents and organizing kind of material around what do you do when your community needs to relocate. How do you organize for it? She sent me a whole bunch of copies of this manual called "Getting Organized and Getting Out."

We [at Earth Justice] and [activists from] the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice organized a training exercise where we would basically go through the manual [with residents]. The manual has an environmental information component to it but the rest is focused on how do you work with people in the community who have different interests. [It points out that] no matter how important those differences are that they not be allowed to stop a unified struggle. For example, where there is a difference between those who want to get out [of the community and relocate] and those who want to stay, the people who are pushing for relocation should be united in saying: 'We want the best possible conditions for people who want to stay. And for the people who want to leave we want to make sure it is done in a just and fair way. Another breakdown [possible division] would be between the homeowners and the renters. The homeowners say that the plant has lowered their market values so it is hard for them to get out but it is easy for renters to leave. But, no, there should be some compensation for renters also because there are expenses involved that need to be taken care of such as moving expenses, security deposits, utility deposits in the apartment they move to.

The magic wand in all this is: stay united. Never say either/or; always say; 'this guy and myself; my family and his family' no matter what the differences may be. Those differences are tiny but if you are not careful they could splinter your struggle. So we really worked on that.

Marjorie [Richard] and Gaynel [Johnson], the leadership of the Concerned Citizens of NORCO, have always focused on relocating Diamond. [They wanted to relocate] for the obvious reason that they are all affected by this pollution. They all have various kinds of health problems. You go in their houses and see oxygen tanks and prescription medicines to deal with all these various symptoms that their families are suffering. And they are also related and they depend on each other. Their grandmother knew the other person's grandmother. And this continues to just go down the line. So there are these connections. These people are related in the way that blood, or family, or marriage . . . and there is this really excellent network of people providing transportation to the hospital when they need to go, taking care of the children when the parent goes off to work, all of that is going on in there. So therefore the idea would be that for those people who want to relocate together as a group that could be done; and those people who just want the money and take it and run -- that is respected also. And again that is another splinter but it is just more things to address. It just adds to the list of things that need to be done as opposed to creating opposites or oppositions.

Shell came down with the [offer to relocate] the first two streets and not the back two streets because there was this 1970s policy that dictates it that way. It [the policy] has never been produced, it was never written down, but even David Brignac knew of this 1970s policy . . . this unwritten thing. And then we found out that it [the policy] didn't say [specify] Washington and Cathy Streets it just said 'fenceline.' Well, 'fenceline' can mean anything to anybody in terms of distance but for them [at Shell] they felt it was that [just the first two streets].

I have been told by people in pretty connected positions with Shell that they understood that the reason to move the people on Washington and Cathy Streets was to get rid of the loud mouths and the activists.

SDL: Oh really.

MH: Yes and I felt that this means that people on Diamond and East Streets, you guys have to get active on this. But Shell wasn't budging. We tried to work with the company to create exceptions to the already established Voluntary Property Purchase Program. They said they would consider exceptions but they never did.

SDL: It was going to be on an individual basis.

MH: Right and no criteria were set up for it. A few people scribbled out notes and David [Brignac] read them and said: 'No, that doesn't cut it.' And that was the process. So we had lots of problems with that. The other thing was that when Marjorie [Richard] decided to leave she did so under a lot of duress and with a lot of turmoil.

SDL: Her mother was sick.

MH: Right. And it was for that reason that her mother was basically a shut-in because going outside would trigger an asthma attack because she was that chemically damaged and sensitive. So when they were able to move . . . her mother died a few months after the move after a hospital stay . . . but the consolation in that to Marjorie was that Miss Eugene really loved the [new] house and she got to work on cultivating that rose bush. Margie's family [ancestors] were teachers and they were also farmers. Those that were educated and went to university, the message was go back to your communities and educate them and build them up. Similarly, the folks in the Shintech fight, for example, Mr. and Mrs. Roberts, he became the principal of the elementary school and she was a teacher from Xavier University. He still farms and gives you mustard greens from the property. And so it was hard on Margie's family not being able to do the gardening that she really loved doing. But Margie continued to give advice, talking with Del [Delwyn Smith], the new president of the Concerned Citizens of NORCO, coming to meetings, giving that extra kick.

SDL: I'm confused. For a while it seemed as if Gaynel Johnson was president [of the Concerned Citizens of NORCO].

MH: Right. Gaynel was on Diamond Street, which was not part of the Property Purchase Program; and she was also a long-term, founding member of the Concerned Citizens of NORCO. Gaynel suffers from serious respiratory problems and what it came down to for her was that if she stayed there [in NORCO] she was going to die. And so she left and moved on her own to a place in LaPlace [up river].

SDL: She had been a renter. So in a way the leadership went from Margie Richard to Gaynel Johnson and then to Delwyn Smith. How would you describe Margie Richard's role in the struggle for relocation of Diamond residents.

MH: Shhh . . . my God, she has been a hero in this whole struggle and made tremendous sacrifices in terms of being away from her family and taking time away to reach out to people and bring help back to the community. And she did it almost on her own without as much support as one would expect to get in a community group. And that is because she is retired and she had the time off. But in terms of having the direction and the focus and never giving up she has been there 100 percent. And often times she was quite prophetic throughout the way about how it was going to happen. And who would be the key players.

Back in a meeting we had in the spring of 1989 I went with a delegation of Louisiana community activists that included Margie Richard and people from some other communities and we went to the United Nations Commission on Civil Rights to speak out about environmental racism in the United States -- human rights violations. It was a tremendous experience for all of us and we were very well received. I was quite surprised and I'm still surprised. It doesn't quite make sense to me. We put together some briefing packets about environmental racism and every day we put out about 75 to 100 packets on this table that was designated for NGOs about literature about extra judicial killings and blood in the street stuff and at lunch time all of our packets would be gone. We wore stickers saying: 'U.S. Environmental Racism Must Stop' every day, we held press briefings. This is in Geneva, Switzerland. It was the first time we were able to push environmental racism as a human rights issue and be able to tie it with various United Nations themes that had treaties or conventions underlying them.

It was at that meeting that Margie was doing this prophetic thing and you would just smile that she would think everything would turn out that way.

SDL: What would she say?

MH: Well, she would say: 'Monique, you are going to be the bridge that is going to cross us over.' And I thought: 'That's nice.' And this is 1999 and we didn't have an offer from Shell to do any relocating anywhere. That came two months later. And now look at where we are right now. Margie is really quite interesting how she comes up with things like that.

SDL: Margie called Anne Rolfes: 'My vanilla sister.' What role has Anne played?

MH: Anne has played a very key role in introducing the Bucket Brigade work in the community, staying on top of the analysis, and also the accountability aspect of it: how do you get this information back to the regulators and the media about what has happened on a given day. She has also been very hands and on-the-ground in the community. Helping folks, doing surveys with folks, for example, just real organizing assistance. She is a very proactive, talented individual and she has been a real dynamo in that community: a real dynamo.

SDL: I know she has spent a lot of time out there. It is striking that here is this white, blond, blue-eyed young woman from Lafayette, Louisiana doing this work in an African-American community. Do some people look askance at that?

MH: I don't know. I think when most people think of an environmental activist they do think of a blue-eyed, blond-haired person. They don't think that it could be them in the community even though they are doing this kind of work. So it is not a surprise. And there has been a history of people from the Sierra Club coming in and pitching in at various times. If she lived on Apple Street [in NORCO] that would be surprising.

SDL: Still, this is an environmental justice campaign and in the past at least often the white environmentalists are not involved with that.

MH: Right.

SDL: It just struck me that Anne [Rolfes] comes from a different background than the people she is working with in Diamond. It's noticeable.

MH: It is noticeable but the one thing that I really love about working with all these communities is this: they are never boring, there is never a dull moment, they are the most civil, kind-hearted people you will ever want to meet. They have been through circumstances that haven't changed them; [hard times haven't] kind of destroyed that heart in them. And any help they can get they will accept.

SDL: So it doesn't matter what color you are.

MH: No, it is the heart. I've been told that by a lot of the community activists: 'We are just looking at the heart. If we can trust them then we welcome them in and give them lots of love in that process.' And they do.

SDL: Was that one of the things that made this work that they were able to draw in so many different kinds of people to help.

MH: Yes.

SDL: I wanted to ask about the legal side of the struggle. Myles and Myles were the legal representatives for the Diamond residents [in their suit against Shell]. Did you meet them?

MH: I never met them. I was in college [at the time of the suit]. The people who were plaintiffs can recall all the details and facts of it. I do know from my talks with community activists that they were not at all happy with what happened. It is my understanding from my conversations with them that at some point during the litigation the course was switched or changed to move the remedies away from more action-oriented injunctive type of remedies . . . meaning you have to relocate these people, you have to make these kinds of changes . . . to one that was solely based on monetary damages . . . you have to give these people so much money.

SDL: You mean they changed from a relocation solution to a nuisance issue.

MH: No, it is all nuisance . . . because this is a nuisance [environmental conditions in Diamond] what are the remedies? The community activists were just saying: 'put us in a better place and they need to make some changes too.' They didn't find out until they were in court and I don't know the details but somehow the remedies had been changed to just seeking monetary damages. The reason that was of concern to the residents, the plaintiffs, was that they knew the people on the jury would not want to give them money . They would be more likely to say: 'Well, if they want to get out let them get out.' But if it is couched in terms of giving those black folks money, then it would be less attractive to people on the jury.

I'm not saying that it was changed; that is their [residents] words. It may always have been in the petition but they never saw it. It was just not being discussed in court. God only knows. When people realized what it was and that their understanding was different they felt really angry about it because this shot them down.

SDL: Betrayed.

MH: I don't know if betrayed is too strong a word because I don't know if the lawyers understood the jury the way the residents understood the jury and understood their thinking about how this will work and this won't work. Maybe they were not thinking strategically about who the jury was.

SDL: Gaynel said that members of the jury came up to them afterwards and said that you should have stuck with relocation. We would have given it to you. But this monetary thing wasn't going to wash.

MH: And the reason for it again is racist paternalism. You give them all this money and they will just buy big fancy cars and stay in the community. You know what I mean? That is not for them to say how the money is to be spent. But it is the racist control factor and that the community was very well aware of it. They knew what worked in their favor and what they wanted.

SDL: Do you know how I can reach them?

MH: No.

SDL: One of the things that happened in Diamond was that two residents were killed: Leroy Jones and Helen Washington back in 1973. There was a case in Canada where there was some kind of explosion, two white people were killed near a Shell facility, and there was a multi-million dollar settlement. What I hear from Diamond residents was that when Jones and Washington were killed the former's mother got $500 and the family of Mrs. Washington got $3,000 for her house that was burned up. I want to ask you to comment on that.

MH: I heard the same figures that you have in your discussion with residents. This goes back to what we were talking about earlier that certainly, historically, by the 1970s . . . the whole nation began turning towards a more racially unified, integrated policies, laws, and incentives. And the company [Shell] didn't do it. And this horrendous tragedy in 1973 shows how little the lives of the African-American residents in the Diamond community meant to Shell at that time. It is beyond an insult. The company doesn't feel sorry for what happened. It doesn't feel sorry for the loss of those lives. It doesn't value the people and what they meant to the community or their families or their survivors. It is sickening to me it really is.

One image sticks with me: residents seeing the young man who was cutting the grass running engulfed in flames and because he was running the flames got bigger. Just imagine seeing that. It is just heart breaking to me. One of the things I have always had my suspicions about is whether or not that whole 1970s [Shell] policy that is referenced for creating this [fenceline] greenbelt may have come out of these deaths. I put the question to them quite pointedly and they say: 'Well, we are not sure, it has never been written.' But at one point, because my suspicions are very strong about that, anything that moves in that direction sounds like AH HAH. And I could be completely off base, but once when we were talking about this, and it could have been because I was saying 1973 with Miss Washington and the young man but at one point the policy was referred to by a Shell representative as the 1973 policy. But then when asked he said: 'I'm not sure I just know it was in the 1970s.'

The point is that if we could link that policy to the deaths of these two individuals the relocation thing has got to happen because people living on Diamond Street remember having Shell representatives come out to them promising to buy their properties right after that happened. And they later said they never made the offer and it was not even possible for them to make the offer.

SDL: I also heard that the offer was for all four of the streets.

MH: What is troubling for me is that if it is true that this policy really comes out of the deaths of those two people and you immediately begin sending your people out to interview folks about relocating them and you then don't do it or you are only willing to do it for peanuts . . . so that people would have to go into huge debt to move . . . how bloody awful is that.

Then almost thirty years later to be haggling over who gets to leave and who not . . . when it is based on this promise that came out of the tragic deaths of those two individuals. That is where my suspicions were. If you say 1970s policy: that is what it is. You got enough of the residents who were alive at the time remembering seeing it, knowing about it, hearing and talking to Shell representatives about buying their properties and then being offered such a small amount that they couldn't in their right minds take it. Or not hearing anything back at all. What more obligation can you put on making good those promises that are made all the more compelling . . .

SDL: Was there ever a finding that Shell was culpable in these deaths?

MH: I don't know what happened in 1973 about authorities being involved. I never even got to think about it that way. The reason is that the way it has always been presented to me is that Shell handled it. And the families, for whatever reason, accepted what they were offered and walked away. And that was all that was done. I never began thinking about, well, what about other agencies getting involved or the Sheriff's Department.

SDL: I asked Brignac about this a number of times. I said that I was waiting to hear how much the families of these people were given in compensation for their deaths. Finally they got back to me and said that they had no records. They said the paper trail from then is gone and the people who were around then are gone. I told them that I was doing interviews in Diamond and I came up with numerous eyewitnesses. Mrs. Pedescleaux saw the break in the pipe and the gas going down the street to where this kid is mowing the grass. I have some now grown men who were then kids on motorbikes who passed in front of Leroy Jones just before the explosion. I have people who were right there and eyewitnesses. And yet Shell is saying they don't have any record of this. I asked Brignac: 'Don't you think it would be important, as you try to build a better relationship with the community, to admit that something bad happened here in 1973; and to address the fact that they are giving multi-million dollar to these people in Canada but that as far as we can ascertain that only $3,500 was given for these two deaths in Diamond?' And Brignac said, well, yes, that was probably something Shell should think about.

What I'd like to ask you is: this seems to be a wrong that was done that was not adequately addressed. It was a long time ago. Has anyone looked into whether there is a legal remedy to this injustice?

MH: It is obvious that the answer is no. There is a statute of limitations and issues prescribe that in Louisiana it is either one to four years. If you have some sort of tort or damage done or that you have suffered from either from the time that they event occurred or that you realized that the doctor left the pair of scissors in you and didn't realize it until December, then the clock begins running. So in terms of litigation that is a dead end. You couldn't pursue it that way.

But it is possible, and check with the Concerned Citizens of NORCO, and the families that were involved in this, as we are now in this kind of Golden Age of Shell, of openness and trying to right wrongs, and understanding, as Wayne Pearce said, that he could never walk in the shoes of Diamond residents and he understands and regret the past, so there may be some opportunities to do some things to correct this.

SDL: There are all kinds of opportunities that come to mind. The simplest and least satisfying would be a plaque . . .

MH: An historical marker.

SDL: Has anyone ever suggested a scholarship program in the names of those who died? In other words an acknowledgement that something went wrong that wasn't adequately addressed and so even if the money doesn't go directly to the families involved at least it goes to the community.

MH: I hear what you are saying. And that is something that the families that are involved and the Concerned Citizens of NORCO may want to spend some time thinking about and figuring out what would be the best thing.

SDL: Did the issue of moving the whole community come up? I mean buy a piece of land and move the whole community to it.

MH: That was discussed when Shell came out with the Voluntary Property Purchase Program as an option with, again, the idea that we didn't want to create any divisions so phrasing it this way. For those folks who want to move together, a subdivision could be built for them. Michael Lithcott is a relocation expert and he basically created a relocation plan from which Shell developed its Voluntary Property Purchase Program. He did that as an employee of Prudential who had been working with Dow on the relocation of the Morrisonville community. Shell was basically operating off of that.

SDL: Dow had moved a whole community?

MH: Yeah, to a new subdivision [actually] two subdivisions that are kind of side-by-side. And the people are very happy with the move. I stay in touch with them on that. But, again, that was treated the same way as the exceptions policy and many other ideas that came up for improvements including extending the offer to all the four streets. All those things were treated the same way: we [at Shell] will consider it but nothing is done to address it. It also came up at the March 1st meeting we had at the Shell facility with Wayne Pearce where he asked some probing questions seeming to indicate some interest in looking at the idea of a new subdivision plan. I was explaining to him what happened with Dow and Morrisonville community in Louisiana.

Some folks want to be able to have their choice and the main thing we wanted to do was at least keep open the possibility that with 12 or more households wanting this maybe it could be done.

SDL: Is it too late?

MH: I kind of think it is as a practical matter. The way I see my role is help residents see reality. So I can advise and say you can think about this factor, did you consider this, or this is the way it has been done before, or here is a recommendation . . . take it or not. That is my role. And I haven't heard people saying that they would really like to relocate together.

SDL: I have because I asked. One aspect of the long struggle for relocation in Diamond is that this settlement clearly constitutes a pretty big win. But there is a downside to it and that is the dispersal of a very close-knit and historic African-American community. While maybe impractical at this point, in describing the Diamond struggle one has to notice that one of the things that didn't happen was that Shell or the community didn't ever realize this idea of moving the whole community intact. So while there was a win about giving people the option to move out or not, what is being lost is the community and the churches and the networks of relatives and friends who helped each other. In looking back on this can you tell me that moving the whole community was an option that was not pursued for various reasons? Or, looking forward, might you not come up again against a situation where it might make sense to move the whole community out of harms way?

MH: The idea of people moving together if the choose to do that . . . I don't know how large that number is but I know it is not 100 percent of the people who want to leave. But they can still do it with the money that they have. It would take longer in terms of finding a developer, getting specifications, so it can still happen. In terms of what they do with their money: it is theirs. Putting it into constructing a subdivision would be cheaper than [Building] one house at a time idea. The possibility is there. One of the things we are going to try to work on is seeing if we can get Michael Lithcott to come back and look at various options that they have under the plan.

SDL: The American Institute of Architects has a subgroup that does new urbanist designs and they were involved in planning the move by Pattonsburg, Missouri, where they moved a town out of the floodplain. They are very effective. They come in and do a design sharette where they elicit from the community what it is that they like about their community. They actually make a list of all the things people like about their community. Then they start doing maps and build up a map of what the new place would look like. Then people can look at it and decide whether or not they would like to live there. And they do a projection of costs of different types of homes. So it occurred to me that this is a model that is out there.

What do you think of this settlement? Do you think it is precedent-setting? What will it mean for other fenceline communities? How did Shell do?

MH: I think it is a great offer and I am basing it on the numerous and comments and thanks and appreciative comments that have come from Diamond residents who have had a chance to look at it and think about how they and their families would benefit from the choice of selling their properties to Shell.

The thing that is important to me is that in addition to the Diamond Options Program, the $200 million investment by Shell to improve its facility to reduce pollution and increase safety is quite considerable. And there are some opportunities there in terms of really transforming the company in a real solid way that could be a kind of shining star example in Louisiana. Where you do have industrial operations you can point to this as a good example because [despite] the horrendous past history something very positive has come out at the end.

SDL: They are talking about putting up an earthen berm so you won't be able to see the plant.

MH: My understanding of the facility improvement money is that it will really go towards the operation and the emission controls.

SDL: What about the people renting mobile homes out in Diamond. What will happen to them? I spoke with a woman who lived in a trailer that was falling apart and she said if you tried to pick it up and move it, it would fall apart and that besides the money they would offer her to move would not be enough.

MH: That is one of the things we are working with Shell on because we see that the mobile home thing is a problem. I don't think that Shell did at first but they are open. We have talked about this last Friday in a detailed way. I told them that on the one hand they are giving renters who live in homes where the owner wants to sell $4,000. But in a case of a mobile home owner where they don't own the land you are only giving $7,500. So there is a real imbalance. We are not saying that the rentals should go down but the obligations and encumbrances that prevent them from having the choice, which is the principle of this. Everyone now has a choice. And in the case of mobile home owners, the woman you talked to is absolutely right. That is one of the main things we are focusing with Shell on and that is that you can't move people to a trailer park where folks are raising bulldogs and have Confederate flags all over the place. That will not work. And they said, yeah, wow, that is true too. So we have to figure out some arrangement that can be made for this situation.

SDL: And as I understand it the Parish does not have a lot of locations where mobile homes are welcome. So a lot of these people will be forced out of the Parish.

MH: Well, that is a situation we don't want to have. And so it might mean, one of the things that was mentioned was that maybe out of the community development money separate and apart from the Diamond Options Program property could be purchased and the trailers moved there. Now the situation where the woman has a problem with the condition of the trailer that needs to be addressed as well. But in terms of where do they go and with what funds and obviously there has to be some infrastructure there for plumbing and electricity. All that has to be put together for them.

SDL: You could see that for a lot of people the Shell Option's Program was going to be a solution; but for other people there it was creating a real problem.

MH: Sure, and the Concerned Citizens of NORCO, the members have been really active in talking with people about what they see as the problems. And the first thing that hits you in the face is the mobile home situation. Her situation sounds as if she is living in a bottle and no one cares. But everyone is working on that because everyone knows it is a problem. In fact one member of the negotiation team is in her situation.

SDL: Does it makes sense to have residential communities right next door to these huge facilities.

MH: No, it never makes sense.

SDL: So should there be a national law about it?

MH: Yes. Sure.

SDL: What should it be?

MH: The national law should create safe distances between residential areas and hazardous industries and should further ensure to the best ability of science and engineering that these facilities are operating with the best controls and the safest alternative materials that can be used in the production of those various products. Those two things need to happen But in Louisiana we don't have anything like that.

I am really encouraged with what European countries are doing with regard to safe distances where they have set up these algorithmic calculations looking at the kind of non-heavy industrial use of a property area. [They are asking:] is this a place where people brush their teeth and sleep, is this a place where people pay their phone bills, and is this a place where people jog, what kind of use does this property get. And depending on that use how industrial are they. They are setting up a calculation for what that [safe] distance ought to be and that distance is based on the worst-case scenario. How many lives will be lost if something awful happens at the facility? Basic kinds of stuff. Now these management facility folks at Shell in Rotterdam facilities in Greece and various European countries are coming together to figure out the planning around these mandates. The European Union countries and various countries are also adopting mandates for safe distances.

What we have here in the U.S. is a situation where, especially early on in environmental justice advocacy, EPA would point the finger at the local zoning board and say it is a zoning issue. And it is not a zoning issue: it is a zoning issue, a land use issue, and a environmental issue and a health issue. All those things combined and not any one entity controls all of those aspects.

Shell hired a consultant to work on community development and they wanted him to get involved in early talks about the Voluntary Property Purchase Program Mustafa Girard [sp?] I asked him if land use planning was his educational background, would you plan a residential neighborhood with a chemical plant across the street or even two blocks away from it. And he giggled and said no. And I said: well, that is what we are all about is how do we create a change here so that where people go and how this town looks would be the ideal land use plan.

But there is enough information about how to do that it is just that it is not all together in a place where authorities can work on it in the context of environmental protection. [Currently,] we are looking at the decision of whether or not a facility should expand or be constructed in the first place by asking whether or not a particular chemical will be processed through a certain kind of device. And then the next question will the emissions from these facilities exceed air quality standards for six pollutants over a very broad regional area that could be in some places five counties wide.

SDL: Why six pollutants?

MH: Because they found out that these six pollutants are indicators of public health and welfare issues. . . . [Currently,] there are 15 facilities within a half-mile of this Morrisonville, a community that has been there since 1812. And there is nothing [no regulation] to say that is wrong. And there is a whole lot to say that they can keep getting bigger. That is absolutely amazing. So that is what really needs to be addressed.

SDL: Do you see any movement in that direction?

MH: Well, yes, but I can't comment on it. But yes: you will be hearing about it soon.

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